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THE PROTECTION ACCORDED PICKETING
BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. Introduction-Peaceful Picketing as a Form of Free Speech
In the context of labor law, the origin of the relationship be-
tween free speech and peaceful picketing is the case of Thornhill
v. Alabama.1 The speech aspects of picketing and the necessarily
accompanying First Amendment protections were stressed by
the Supreme Court in holding unconstitutional a state statute
which constituted a broad ban on all picketing. The Court ex-
pressly limited the holding by recognizing that a narrowly word-
ed statute, such as one merely interdicting picketing en masse or
picketing portending imminent danger may be valid. An addi-
tional limitation of the decision is the fact that it was reached
under a "balancing of interests" test; consequently, the holding
is impliedly qualified.
The doctrine enunciated by Thornhill fluctuated in applica-
tion until Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.2 was decided
by the Supreme Court in 1949. There the union had picketed
respondent in an attempt to force him to stop sales to distributor-
customers who had resisted unionization efforts. The state court
enjoined the picketing, basing the injunction upon statutes pro-
hibiting restraint of trade. The injunction was upheld and a gen-
eral principle was announced that picketing can be regulated or
prohibited, even if peaceful in nature, where it is used to accom-
plish an unlawful purpose. The determination of what represents
an unlawful purpose was based on an ends-means test under
which it is necessary to ascertain whether the state has authority
to regulate the particular ends sought. In Giboney, the Court
found that the state statutes against restraint of trade were valid
and that picketing was an integrated speech-action activity which
could not be separated into its component parts.
The unlawful purpose test was expanded in subsequent
cases, which culminated in International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. Vogt, Inc.3 In that decision the Supreme Court sum-
marized the cases following Thornhill's broad doctrine and
1 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 80, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
2 Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949).
3 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 77 S.Ct.
1166 (1957).
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reached the position that "a State, in enforcing some public
policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether an-
nounced by its legislature or its courts, could constitutionally en-
join peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that
policy." The Court appeared to be more concerned with the co-
ercive effects of picketing than with its speech aspects, and
accordingly sanctioned all but a broad ban on such activity.
Although the Court appeared to give greater regard to the
non-speech aspects of picketing in the Vogt case, the basic con-
cept of peaceful picketing being "speech plus" had already been
recognized and was clearly articulated in Bakery Drivers Local
v. Wohl 4: "Picketing by an organized group is more than free
speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since
the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind
or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are
being disseminated." 5 The early recognition of this distinction
and its basic application in cases prior to Vogt clearly set the
stage for Vogt's unrestrained acceptance of the doctrine into the
field of labor law.
Although the primary concern of this discussion is free
speech in the labor law context, the effects of the First Amend-
ment are obviously not so restricted, and the decisions based
thereon in the other areas cannot be ignored. An early case
recognizing the state's authority under properly drawn statutes
to regulate public demonstrations is Cox v. New Hampshire.7
However, the court there recognized that the First Amendment
and the speech aspects of such demonstrations represent a re-
4 Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 766, 62 S.Ct. 816 (1942).
5 Id. at 769, 62 S.Ct. at 819.
6 In Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950) a state court
injunction against peaceful picketing of a store to secure employment in a
percentage equal to the racial origin of its customers was upheld by the
Supreme Court because there was a valid state policy against involuntary
employment on a racial basis.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470,
70 S.Ct. 773 (1950) the Supreme Court upheld a state court injunction
against picketing to procure a union shop where the business was operated
by the owner himself without employees. The state injunction was again
based on a valid state policy.
In Building Service Emp. International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532(1950) a state injunction against picketing following an unsuccessful attempt
to unionize a small hotel was based on the state's valid policy against em-
ployee coercion of the employer's choice of bargaining agent. The Supreme
Court upheld the injunction because of the state's valid policy.
7 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762 (1941).
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straint upon the state's regulatory authority. The non-speech
aspects of picketing and parading were stressed by the Court in
Cox v. Louisiana,8 where such attributes were recognized as
subjecting picketing to a degree of regulation not possible in the
case of pure speech. The Court quoted Giboney as follows:
"(I)t has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."
The Court, nevertheless, reversed the conviction, declaring
that the state statute was too broad and provided too much
discretion in its application. Shortly after this decision, in
Brown v. Louisiana,9 the court reversed a conviction based on
the same state statute. In this instance a number of persons pro-
testing segregation had staged an orderly and peaceful "sit in"
in a public library. Rather than mechanically vacate the con-
viction and remand on the basis of the Cox decision, the Court
examined the facts and noted that the occurrence took place in
a public library and that the basis of the conviction was com-
mission of a breach of the peace. The Court then found that no
breach of the peace had occurred and added that the First
Amendment is not confined to verbal expression, but embraces
appropriate actions, including the right to protest by silence and
reproachful presence. Whether the "appropriate actions" the
Court spoke of be considered as action literally or as a form of
speech, it is apparent that not all such speech-action conduct can
be prohibited. Picketing, recognized as speech plus, falls within
this class of conduct, and similar First Amendment considerations
arise when there is an attempt to regulate or prohibit it.
II. The Values of Free Speech
It would obviously be meaningless to argue that picketing,
because of its speech aspects, should be protected if there existed
no reason to protect free speech. The purposes of free speech
protection are succinctly stated by Emerson 0 as being: assurance
of individual self fulfillment, attainment of the truth, securement
of participation by the members of society in social and political
8 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 453 (1965).
9 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719 (1966).
10 T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 20-24
(1966).
Spring, 1969
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decision-making, and maintenance of the delicate balance be-
tween stability and change in society. Admittedly these purposes
are broad, but there can be no doubt that the labor interests of
employees, employers and unions fit exceptionally well within
them.
The author contends that the best system of free expression
is that permitting the maximum of freedom with the minimum
of governmental restraint. The principal merit of this approach
is that it compels a frequent re-evaluation of accepted ideas and
concepts, because they are constantly being challenged. Another
advantage of this approach lies in its recognition of the fact that
it is difficult to establish limits on expression. Limitation is diffi-
cult, since the real desire is usually to eliminate the expected
result of the expression, rather than the expression itself. This
means that the task of trying to predict the future is placed upon
those who seek to establish such limits.
III. The First Amendment Protection Afforded Secondary
Consumer Picketing
Thus far the discussion has been largely of a general nature,
in order to establish the relationship between free speech and
picketing. The following paragraphs pertain mainly to the more
narrow topic of secondary consumer picketing and the protection
given the same. The discussion is not concerned with violent, en
masse picketing or other illegal forms of same.
A general definition of a consumer boycott is: a campaign
by a union having a dispute with an employer to persuade his
employees and the public not to make purchases of his goods.
This would be a primary consumer boycott. A secondary con-
sumer boycott arises when the union extends its plea to dis-
courage purchase of the employer's products at his retail outlets.
The retailers are considered neutral as to the dispute in this
instance. The distinction between a primary and a secondary
boycott is not always clear and turns upon evidence concerning
the object or intent of the union.
Congress has dealt with consumer or informational picketing
in two sections of the National Labor Relations Act as amended
by the Landrum-Griffin Act." The most pertinent section, 8(b)
11 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, § 704 (a), 703 Stat. 542
(1959). 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B), amending Labor Management Rela-
tions Act § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1958).
4
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4 (ii) (B) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization ... (4) .. . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or re-
strain any person engaged in commerce ... where ...an object
thereof is ... (B) forcing or requiring any person to ... cease
doing business with any other person . . . Provided further that
for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other
than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public
.". This legislation was a result of Congress's efforts to close
certain loopholes in the prior act, which was itself considered an
effort to outlaw all secondary picketing or boycotts. 12 The loop-
holes in the prior act were provided by such concepts as primary
and secondary employers, the ally doctrine, 13 roving situs, 14 and
individual inducement. 15 The use of these concepts, coupled with
restrictive interpretations of "inducement," served to avoid the
intent of Congress and lessen the impact of the law.
The new legislation on its face appears to prohibit all second-
ary employer pressure designed to force him to cease doing busi-
ness with the primary employer. The statute does not enumerate
the types of secondary pressures, but certainly they would ap-
pear to include picketing, and substantial evidence of this con-
struction can be found in the legislative history. However, the
real crux of the problem lies in the interpretation of the proviso
to section 8 (b) 4. The proviso, which was not part of the original
Act, was inserted as a result of a fear that the Act would outlaw
all secondary consumer appeals, which would probably be un-
constitutional. 16 The proviso, designed to avoid constitutional
12 G. Farmer, Strikes, Picketing, and Secondary Boycotts Under the Lan-
drum-Griffin Amendments 10-11 (1960).
13 N.L.R.B. v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Conference
Board, IUE, Local 459, (Royal Typewriter Co.), 228 F.2d 553 (2nd Cir. 1955)
Cert. Denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956).
14 Sailor's Union of the Pacific v. Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 547
(1950).
15 N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 71 S.Ct. 961
(1951).
16 105 Cong. Rec. 6232 (1959), 2 U.S. NLRB Legislative History of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. (Hereinafter cited as
Leg. Hist.) at 1037.
In criticism of the Landrum-Griffin amendment-before the proviso was
inserted-Congressman Udall stated:
"The Landrum bill forbids this elementary freedom to appeal to the
general public for assistance in winning fair labor standards. The union
could be enjoined upon the ground that it was coercing or restraining
(Continued on next page)
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problems, did just that, except for those associated with picket-
ing. Apparently Congress believed that picketing was not con-
stitutionally protected and could be totally excluded from statu-
tory protection, as evidenced by the proviso language and its
legislative history.17 It is noteworthy, however, that the picket-
ing exception merely exists in a proviso, and one could argue
that the prohibition would not extend to picketing which did not
have as an object forcing or requiring the secondary employer
to stop doing business with the primary employer.
One is not confined to an argument grounded solely on
statutory construction, however, for an examination of the recent
cases under the statute makes it evident that a complete ban on
all secondary consumer picketing would be unconstitutional.
Admittedly, the cases never reach this position directly, but the
Supreme Court has been influenced by other considerations and
has consequently chosen to reach this position in an indirect
fashion. It is believed that the discussion that follows will estab-
lish the viability of the Thornhill-free speech/picketing doctrine
and the Court's recognition (direct or indirect) thereof in the
area of secondary consumer picketing.
IV. The "Speech" and "Action" Aspects of Secondary Consumer
Picketing
The existence of a Constitutionally-protected license of free
speech discloses that a balancing of issues (i.e. the desirability
of free speech v. the possibly harmful results of such a liberty)
has already occurred to a degree. The incorporation of such a
(Continued from preceding page)
the dealer .... As I understand it, one of the acknowledged purposes
of the amendment is to prevent unions appealing to the general public
as consumers for assistance in a labor dispute. This is a basic infringe-
ment upon freedom of expression."
17 Id. at 17720, 2 Leg. Hist. at 1388-89
Senator Kennedy, reporting on the proviso, said:
"Under the language of the conference, we agreed there would not
be picketing at a secondary site. What was permitted was the giving
out of handbills or information through the radio, and so forth."
Id. at 17898-99, 2 Leg. Hist. 1431-32
Senator Kennedy concluded his report on the proviso by saying:
"We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit pick-
eting in front of the secondary shops, but we were able to persuade
them to agree that the union shall be free to conduct informational
activity short of picketing. In other words, the union can hand out
handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make
announcements over the radio, and can carry on all publicity short of
having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site."
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liberty in the First Amendment precludes a full rebalancing of
interests to justify regulations aimed at social objectives. The
function of the court is to develop and apply a workable defini-
tion of the terms "no law," "which abridges," and "freedom of
speech." Of course, this necessarily involves a weighing of com-
peting considerations, but open-end balancing is no longer pos-
sible.
The regulation of picketing presents a problem, because
picketing is not pure speech. Thus a functional definition of
"freedom of speech" must be used to distinguish speech from
action, the latter being subject to regulation but not the former.
A factor which may cause picketing to fall into either of the
classes at different times is whether or not the particular harm
it threatens to cause is immediate and irremediable. It appears
that consumer picketing examined in a context of action v. ex-
pression can conceivably fall within either of these classes.
Under the above-outlined approach to the First Amendment,
secondary consumer picketing is not subject to a prior and
complete interdiction. Such a prohibition is precluded by the
possibility of the picketing falling within the protected expression
category, which is not subject to regulation nor to an absolute
prohibition based upon a complete rebalancing of interests.
V. Supreme Court Rulings on Secondary Consumer Picketing
A. N.L.R.B. v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen
Local 760 (Tree Fruits) s
Here the union was charged with a violation of section 8(b)
(4) (ii)B when it engaged in consumer picketing of retail stores
that distributed the product of the primary employer. The pick-
eting did not disturb deliveries or interfere with the operations
of the retail employers. It was designed merely to induce con-
sumers not to purchase the specified product.
The N.L.R.B. found that a violation had been committed
based upon a literal reading of the statute and its legislative
history.19 It concluded that all secondary consumer picketing
had been prohibited. This conclusion indicates that the N.L.R.B.
determined that Congress believed such picketing always threat-
ens, coerces, or restrains the secondary employer, and that such
18 N.L.R.B. v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 84 S.Ct. 1063 (1964).
19 See legislative history quoted in note 17.
Spring, 1969
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activity is subject to a prior restraint, as it does not enjoy pro-
tection under the First Amendment.
The Court of Appeals reversed the action of the Board and
declared that a conviction requires a showing of conduct that
amounts to a threat, coercion, or restraint. The Board's reading
of the statute would create substantial first amendment problems
in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 20 The Supreme Court
affirmed, but disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of
the statute. Somewhat surprisingly, the Court construed the
statute as only prohibiting such picketing when it is designed
to shut off all trade with the secondary employer (unless he aids
the union in its dispute with the primary employer). The Court
essentially adopted a theory recognized in the state courts, which
have permitted a do-not-buy-the-product appeal but have pro-
hibited a do-not-trade-at-all appeal. 21 The Court adopted a rule
of construction requiring a clear indication by Congress in the
legislative history to ban any picketing, including peaceful pick-
eting. This rule of construction, used in conjunction with a policy
of dealing with "isolated evils" 22 in this area by Congress, was
utilized by the Court to reach its interpretation of the statute.
The Court greatly discounted the legislative history relied upon
by the Board on the ground that it was presented by the oppo-
nents to the bill.23 The Court also noted that where Congress
meant to ban picketing per se, it made its intentions very clear,
as in section 8(b) (7). Finally, the Court invoked the maxim that
statutes are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid deciding
a constitutional question.
When the legislative history is reviewed as a whole and the
literal language of the statute considered, the Court's construc-
tion cannot be regarded as that intended by Congress or ex-
pressed by it. Moreover, the decision does not seem supportable
on the facts.24 The real issues presented are: whether or not all
secondary consumer picketing is by its nature coercive, threaten-
20 Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. N.L.R.B., 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
21 Goldfinger v. Feintuck, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. 2d 910 (1937).
22 N.L.R.B. v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274, 284 (1960).
23 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-395 (1951).
"The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the
construction of legislation. It is the sponsor that we look to when the mean-
ing of the statutory words is in doubt."
24 See Lewis, The Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 479
(1965).
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ing, or restraining; and whether or not Congress has (or could)
prohibit it.
Examining the statute itself, it is obvious that the proviso
was intended to permit publicity which does not induce a work
stoppage at the secondary site. However, under the Court's con-
struction such publicity is only saved if it entails simply a "do-
not-buy-the-product" appeal. Thus the Court has in effect nar-
rowed the scope of the proviso in its efforts to avoid a constitu-
tional question. In addition, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his
dissent, the Court's test does not solve the problem if the second-
ary employer only sold the single product. In that instance, ado-not-buy-the-product appeal would be a highly coercive pres-
sure upon the secondary employer, which Congress sought to
eliminate.
The Court of Appeals appeared to recognize the real issue
and under its construction of the statute-requiring a showing
of a coercive effect-no constitutional problems arise. (This
construction also satisfies the problem posed by Mr. Justice Har-
lan.) Furthermore, the Court of Appeals sought to distinguish
the speech and actions aspects of picketing. If the picketing was
shown to be a coercive pressure, it would be properly classified
as action and subject to regulation.
The Supreme Court, however, only alluded to the problem
and did not resolve it without doing violence to the plain statu-
tory language. In light of the legislative history, the Court may
even have been obligated to overturn the statute as a prior re-
straint upon freedom of speech. It has generally been stated that
First Amendment rights should be carefully guarded and, as
Emerson stated the proposition:
"The Court's obligation to bow to the will of the legislature
and the executive is at a minimum where a serious claim ofinfringement of freedom of expression on the part of thoseinstitutions is presented. In this sense, from the judicialpoint of view, freedom of expression should be regarded as
a preferred freedom." 24a
B. N.L.R.B. v. Servette25
Servette was a wholesale distributor of food products and
was engaged in a strike with the Wholesale Drivers Union. The
union sought support by requesting local retail store managers
24a T. Emerson, supra note 10, at 45.
25 N.L.R.B. v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 84 S.Ct. 1098 (1964).
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to discontinue handling of Servette products. The managers
were also advised that if they refused to cooperate, handbills
would be distributed to the public in front of their stores re-
questing that Servette products be not purchased.
The Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that no
violation of section 8 (b) (4) (ii) occurred. Although this is not
a picketing case, but involves handbilling, which the N.L.R.B.
distinguished from picketing in the Lohman case,26 it does pro-
vide an interesting comparison to the Tree Fruits case, which
was decided at the same time by the Court.
In both cases the unions sought protection for their actions
under the proviso to section 8 (b) (4) (ii) B. The Court in Tree
Fruits construed legislative history so as to define the proviso as
being applicable to "a do-not-buy-the-product plea" only. This
conclusion was arrived at by attributing to Congress the inten-
tion to deal with the "isolated evil" of a general plea not to trade
with the secondary employer. If this construction had been used
in Servette, the case would have presented no problem to the
Court, since the handbilling merely requested that consumers re-
frain from purchasing certain products, and therefore was non-
coercive and clearly within the proviso's protection. The Court,
however, did not content itself with this reasoning but deemed it
necessary to find that the handbilling was otherwise non-
coercive and within the proviso's coverage. Although this is a
hair-splitting point, it is given weight by the fact that both de-
cisions were handed down the same day. This suggests that the
Court itself was somewhat dubious about its use of legislative
history to reach the Tree Fruits decision.
The Court's tendency to avoid constitutional issues in the
picketing area is further illustrated by Youngdahl v. Rainfair,27
which was decided nearly seven years prior to the Tree Fruits
case. As a result of earlier violence, the State court in Rainfair
enjoined all picketing. The Supreme Court was faced with
almost the identical situation which it confronted in Milk Wagon
Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc.,28 where it upheld
such an injunction, but it chose a different solution this time.
Rather then create constitutional implications, the Court in Rain-
26 N.L.R.B. v. Lohman Sales Co., 132 NLRB 901 (1962).
27 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
28 Milk Wagon Drivers, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312 U.S. 287
(1941).
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fair held that the State court could enjoin future acts of violence,
but that it entered the preempted domain of the N.L.R.B. when
it enjoined all picketing-including peaceful picketing. Thus, the
Court relied upon the federal preemption doctrine rather than
concern itself with free speech. The preemption doctrine un-
deniably has a substantial and practical basis. It serves to pro-
tect the statutory scheme adopted by Congress in the particular
area and prevents state courts from disrupting that scheme by
construing statutes in a manner inconsistent with Congress's
intended plan. Moreover, in the circumstances at hand, Con-
gress has attempted to balance the competing forces of the union-
employee and the employer in an extremely delicate area. Con-
sequently, the Court's deference to the will of Congress is un-
derstandable. However, the opposing consideration-protection
of free speech-is considered to be of at least equal importance
by many writers.
C. Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 et al v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., et al.29
Here the Union had peacefully picketed respondent store
(Weis), which was located in the shopping center owned by re-
spondent Logan Valley Plaza (Logan). Weis was not a union-
organized store and the pickets' signs so stated. The pickets
patrolled the parcel pick-up zone owned by Weis and the imme-
diate parking lot area owned by Logan.
The union was enjoined by the State court from picketing in
the pick-up zone and parking lot and was permitted merely to
picket on the berm between the lot and streets, which was quite
some distance from the store. (The Court recognized that this
would render the picketing ineffective.) The State Supreme
Court upheld the injunction, relying solely upon property-
trespass principles. The union grounded its petition for certiorari
solely upon the First Amendment. No question of Federal pre-
emption was presented.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the state court
and held that the shopping center was quasi public property sim-
ilar to that involved in Marsh v. Alabama,30 and that a state rely-
29 Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 et al. v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., et al., 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601 (1968).
30 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946). In this case, the
Court held that a privately owned town was considered public property, at
least for First Amendment purposes.
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ing solely upon its trespass laws may not wholly deny the use of
such an area to those desiring to exercise their First Amendment
rights in a peaceful and appropriate manner.
Although there are several major issues raised by this case
-such as that presented by the quasi public property finding-
the application of the First Amendment to protect picketing is
of primary concern here.
The Court first drew upon the Thornhill decision to invoke
the First Amendment relationship to peaceful picketing. Then
it recognized the speech plus quality of picketing, which makes
possible regulation that would not be permissible if picketing
were pure speech. Then, the Court stated: "Nevertheless, no
case decided by this Court can be found to support the propo-
sition that the nonspeech aspects of peaceful picketing are so
great as to render the provisions of the First Amendment in-
applicable to it altogether." 31 The quote plainly and succinctly
states what the Court believed (but only with great effort found
Congress to believe in the Tree Fruits case decision), namely,
that no complete prior ban on all secondary (peaceful) con-
sumer picketing is constitutionally valid. Where injunctions
against picketing have been upheld, as the Court notes, an illegal
purpose has been found or a situation within the Vogt doctrine
has existed. The Court declared that picketing may not be pro-
hibited under a trespass theory where the property used is quasi
public property. The case is even clearer, observed the Court,
when the picketing constitutes an activity consistent with the
typical use made of such property.
The most significant aspect of this case is the Court's reliance
upon the First Amendment to protect peaceful picketing. The
Court thereby affirmed the vitality of the Thornhill doctrine and
unhesitatingly decided an important constitutional issue in the
field of labor law.
VI. Conclusion
The thesis proposed earlier-that peaceful consumer picket-
ing is constitutionally protected and therefore cannot be totally
prohibited even when it is a secondary measure-seems to be
correct.
True, the pertinent N.L.R.A. sections and the relevant legis-
lative history appear to prohibit all such secondary picketing;
31 88 S.Ct. at 1606.
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however, the relevant cases decided under those sections indicate
otherwise. The Supreme Court has refused to directly overturn
the legislation in question, but it has adopted other methods to
arrive at essentially the same result.32 The approach taken by
the Court may be attributable: to its general policy of avoiding
constitutional questions where other grounds are available for
a decision; to a preference to apply the "Second Look Doc-
trine"; 33 or to a desire to refrain from disturbing the statutory
labor scheme provided by Congress. Because of the Court's cir-
cuitous approach, the stated proposition is never directly reached.
Nevertheless, no one can reasonably doubt that a total prohibition
of peaceful picketing, primary or secondary, would be invali-
dated by the Supreme Court.
The Court's seemingly hyper-cautious approach in this area
is perhaps not unjustified when the sensitivity of labor policy
problems is considered. However, the speech aspects of picketing
provide a compelling reason for the Court to act in a more un-
equivocal manner. As noted earlier, a number of writers believe
free speech to be a "preferred freedom" and one which the Court
should aggressively protect.
JOSEPH J. CORSO
32 The decisions in the Tree Fruits and Logan Valley cases and the dicta
in the Brown controversy appear to support this statement.
33 Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957). Employing this doctrine, the
Court sometimes intentionally disregards the legislative will and purpose
in order to force Congress to re-examine the legislation.
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